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Thursday, June 23, 2011

BRAHAM SUTRAS


2. And on account of the non-perception of the
others (i.e. the effects of the pradhâna, according to the Sânkhya system).
The principles different from the pradhâna, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sânkhya) Smriti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smriti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense--Smriti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Smriti which is concerned with the effects (i.e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhâna) will be so likewise. This is what the Sûtra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smritis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sânkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.

3. Thereby the Yoga (Smriti) is refuted.
This Sûtra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sânkhya-smriti the Yoga-smriti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhâna as the independent cause of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sûtra does.)--We reply that here an additional
cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for instance, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon 1.' In theSvetâsvatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8).
Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;' 'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-sâstra itself the passage, 'Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the sâstra at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire Yoga-smriti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just as the Smriti referring to the ashtakâs 2.--To this we reply that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed against the Sânkhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-smriti being authoritative, the disagreement (between Smriti and Sruti) on other topics remains as shown above.--Although 3 there are many Smritis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sânkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest
end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sânkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (Sve. Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might be set up for the Sânkhya and Yoga-smritis in their entirety) we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sânkhya-smriti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up. Ill, 8). And the Sânkhya and Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sânkhya and Yoga') the terms 'Sânkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from proximity 1. We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities the Sânkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure; cp. Bri. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrâgaka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c. (Gâbâla Upan. IV).
The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Smritis. If it be said that those Smritis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain
all the same that the truth can be known from the Vedânta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as 'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads' (Bri. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.

4. (Brahman can)not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such, (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.
The objections, founded on Smriti, against the doctrine of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.--But (to raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious duty (dharma),--(To this the pûrvapakshin replies), The analogy between Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties, i.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing, and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so Sruti, if in conflict with other means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter. Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than Sruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge
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of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition--sâkshâtkâra--of Brahman), and as such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like dharma) 1. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of the difference of nature of this (effect)'--The Vedântic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedântin considers as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure, consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is
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gold the material cause of earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character. The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.--This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for nor against any other being. For the Sânkhyas are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking in or giving out anything 1, and are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor  2 is there anything
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to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.--Here somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of the modification 1. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent).--This reasoning--the pûrvapakshin replies--if valid might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between
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[paragraph continues] Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared in the latter part of the Sûtra, 'And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire world--which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c.--must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage, 'It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intelligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman.--But--somebody might again object--the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. 'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (Sat. Br. VI, 1, 3, 2; 4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These prânas when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to Brahman' (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They said to Speech: Do thou sing out for us' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 2).--To this objection the pûrvapakshin replies in the following Sûtra.
5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of the difference and the connexion.
The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are
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not entitled to base the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an intellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke,' &c. because 'there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so? 'On account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand, and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushîtakins in their account of the dispute of the prânas make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order to include the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities contending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these deities having recognised the pre-eminence in prâna' (Kau. Up. II, l4).--And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavâdas, Itihâsas, Purânas, &c. all declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as 'Agni having become Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the passages supplementary to the quarrel of the prânas we read in one place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they went to Pragâpati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence and absence, each of them, as Pragâpati had advised, departing from the body for some time ('They went to their father Pragâpati and said,' &c.; Kh. Up. V, 1, 7); and in another place it is said that they made an offering to prâna (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 13), &c.; all of them proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending
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deities. In the case of such passages as, 'Fire thought,' we must assume that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is connected with its effects as a superintending principle--From all this it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence cannot have it for its material cause.
To this objection raised by the pûrvapakshin the next Sûtra replies.
6. But it is seen.
The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.
Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on account of the difference of its character is not founded on an absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.--But--to state an objection--the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent bodies only of scorpions are the effectsof non-intelligent dung.--Even thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of nature--due to the cause passing over into the effect--between the bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is, on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two) would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and
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cow-dung there is one characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence (sattâ), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).--He, moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must assert that he understands by difference of attributes either the non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other) characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause (for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an effect of Brahman? (The upholder ofBrahman would simply not admit any such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahmanfor its material cause. And that all such assertions are contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the world. It has indeed been maintained by the pûrvapakshin that the other means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman, on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be accomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of
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perception; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holytradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation sprang?' (Rig-v. Samh. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings (îsvara) 1 of extraordinary power and wisdom.
There are also the following Smriti passages to the same effect: 'Do not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable 2;' 'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions of the gods know my origin, not the great rishis. For I myself am in every way the origin of the gods and great rishis' (Bha. Gî. X, 2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the sacredtexts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world; that as the world springs fromBrahman it cannot be separate from Brahman,
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according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &c. 1 The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He 2, moreover, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i. e. the Sânkhya), would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.
If, then, on account of difference of character that which is intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhâna of the Sânkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.--(So much for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.
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7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object).
If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of aneffect which is of an opposite nature, i. e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered as non-existing before its actual origination. But this consequence cannot be acceptable to you--the Vedântin--who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the cause already.
This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation without an object to be negatived. The negation (implied in 'non-existent') can certainly not have for its object the existence of the effectprevious to its origination, since the effect must be viewed as 'existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause; according to such scriptural passages as, 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6). In so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the cause, its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the effect (as after it).--But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as sound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those qualities)!--True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning (of the effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual beginning.--This point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect.
8. On account of such consequences at the time
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of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.
The pûrvapakshin raises further objections.--If an effect which is distinguished by the qualities of grossness, consisting of parts, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c., is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brahman), the effect, by entering into the state of non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties. As therefore--on your doctrine--the cause (i.e. Brahman) as well as the effectis, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.--Another objection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which are actually observed to exist).--A third objection is that, if we assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highestBrahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have obtained final release again appear in the new world.--If you finally say, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing separate from the cause is not possible.--For all these reasons the Vedânta doctrine is objectionable.
To this the next Sûtra replies.
9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.
There is nothing objectionable in our system.--The objection that the effect when being reabsorbed into its
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cause would inquinate the latter with its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are parallel instances,' i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are reabsorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c., which in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay), impart to the latter their individual qualities; nor do golden ornaments impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i. e. gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities to the latter at the time of reabsorption. You (i. e. the pûrvapakshin), on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For reabsorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its individual properties. And 1 that in spite of the non-difference of cause and effectthe effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under II, 1, 14.
Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to the cause at the time of reabsorption is formulated too narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages, as, for instance, 'This everything is that Self' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'The Self is all this' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal Brahman is this before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'All this is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1).
With regard to the case referred to in the Sruti-passages we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the
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effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also.--We can quote other examples in favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the highest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one dreaming person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers knowing the true tradition of the Vedânta have made the following declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of slumber by the beginningless Mâyâ awakes, then it knows the eternal, sleepless, dreamless non-duality' (Gaudap. Kâr. I, 16).
So far we have shown that--on our doctrine--there is no danger of the cause being affected at the time of reabsorption by the qualities of the effect, such as grossness and the like.--With regard to the second objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no special reason for the origin of a new world affected with distinctions, we likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction; nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, 'All these creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a
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wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again' (Kh. Up. VI, 9, 2; 3) For just as during the subsistence of the world the phenomenon of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of all distinction; so, we conclude, there remains, even after reabsorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded on wrong knowledge.--Herewith the objection that--according to our doctrine--even the finally released souls would be born againis already disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong knowledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.--The last alternative finally (which the pûrvapakshin had represented as open to the Vedântin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not admitted by the Vedântins themselves.--Hence the system founded on the Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.
10. And because the objections (raised by the Sânkhya against the Vedânta doctrine) apply to his view also.
The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which he urges against us, viz. in the following manner.--The objection that this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference of character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhâna being the cause of the world; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhâna devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character being thus admitted, the Sânkhya is equally driven to the doctrine that before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover, it being admitted (by the Sânkhya also) that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction from the cause, the case of the Sânkhya here also is the same as ours.--And, further, if
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[paragraph continues] (as the Sânkhya also must admit) at the time of reabsorption the differences of all the special effectsare obliterated and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them; and if you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the pradhâna 1.--It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by the Sânkhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against either only. But as either of the twodoctrines must necessarily be accepted, we are strengthened-—by the outcome of the above discussion--in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real difficulties 2
11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus also there would result non-release.
In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn
by other men; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else; since we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Kanâda, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one another.
But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our reasoning otherwise, i.e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the charge of having no proper foundation. You cannot, after all, maintain that no reasoning whatever is well-founded; for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and the future are uniform.--Further, in the case of passages of Scripture (apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense, can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also expresses himself: 'Perception, inference, and the sâstra according to the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring clearness in regard to right.--He who applies reasoning not contradicted by the Veda to the Veda and the (Smriti) doctrine of law, he, and no other, knows the law' (Manu Smriti XII, 105, 106). And that 'want of foundation', to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjectionable arguments by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments 1. (No fear that because the
pûrvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhânta should be ill-founded too;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid.--For all these reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against reasoning.
Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results 'want of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will result 'want of release,' viz. of the reasoning from this very fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holytexts; for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception, because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge.--Or else (if we adopt another explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity, because it depends on accomplished actually existing things; for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge?--Nor can it be said that he who maintains the
pradhâna to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Sânkhya) is the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.--Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of this our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apartfrom it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to 'absence of final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world.

12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained.
Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedânta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the pradhâna being the cause of the world; (which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.--But now some dull-witted persons might think that another objection founded on reasoning might be raised against the Vedânta, viz. on the ground of the atomic doctrine. The Sûtrakâra, therefore, extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by
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either Manu or Vyâsa or other authorities, are to be considered as 'explained,' i.e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhâna doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same, there is no room for further doubt. Such common arguments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped 'otherwise' (see the preceding Sûtra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on
13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versâ) there would result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.
Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world.--Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and arthavâdas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge 1). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposite 2.--Hence Scripture cannot be acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?' we give you the following
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instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versâ. Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-establisheddistinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.
To the preceding objection we reply, 'It may exist as in ordinary experience.' Even on our philosophic view the distinctionmay exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and, again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered into it,' Taitt. Up. II, 6), still afterBrahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting
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adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.
14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as 'origin' and the like.
The 1 refutation contained in the preceding Sûtra was set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i.e. has no existence apart from the cause.--How so?--'On account of the scriptural word "origin" and others.' The word 'origin' is used in connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thingeverything is known; viz. Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4, 'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely; thus,' &c.--The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay 2, there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual effects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far
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as they are clay they are true.--This parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman; applying the phrase 'having its origin in speech' to the case illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman.--Later on again the text, after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effectsof Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart from them, 'Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Kh. Up. VI, 4, 1).--Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the 'and others' of the Sûtra. Such texts are, 'In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'This everything, all is that Self' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahmanalone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'There is in it no diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).--On any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares). We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty steppe--for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i. e. apart from the surface of the desert 1)--; so this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence apart from Brahman.--But--it might be objected--Brahman has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers
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and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release resulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the element of unity (inBrahman), while the two processes of common worldly activity and of activity according to the Veda--which depend on the karmakânda--may be established in connexion with the element of manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c. agree very well.
This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance (quoted in the Upanishad) the phrase 'as clay they are true' asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase 'having its origin in speech' declares the unreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, 'In that all this has its Self;' and, again, 'That is true;' whereby it is asserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage again, 'That is the Self; thou art that, O Svetaketu!' teaches that the embodied soul (the individual soul) also isBrahman. (And we must note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied soul having its Self inBrahman is self-established, not to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having its Self inBrahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire phenomenal world--which is based on the individual soul--having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in
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addition to the element of unity.--Scriptural passages also (such as, 'When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' Bri. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain states; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows that the general fact of Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state. Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Kh. VI, 16) that the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released, declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called false-minded 1? Another scriptural passage ('from death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity,' Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.--Moreover, on the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the cognition of manifoldness if both are true?
Other objections are started.--If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c., become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has presented itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their validity depends
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does not really exist. And further, the entire body of doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine?
These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without suspecting the perception to be a merely apparent one.--But how (to restate an objection raised above) can the Vedânta-texts if untrue convey information about the true being of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake (i.e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing 1.--This objection, we reply, is without force (because as a matter of fact we do see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,)
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and effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a river take place with regard to a dreaming person.--But, it will be said, these effects themselves are unreal!--These effects themselves, we reply, are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal, but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of them to be unreal likewise.--(We remark in passing that) by this fact of the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be 'considered as refuted  1.--Scripture also (in the passage, 'If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer therefrom success in his work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage, after having declared that from the observation of certain unfavourable omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues 'if somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man kills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, viz. death, is notified.--It is, moreover, known from the experience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the
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[paragraph continues] Self are altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required for full satisfaction 1. An injunction as, for instance, 'He is to sacrifice' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected; but passages such as, 'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else remains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman. Nor can it be maintained that such states of consciousness do not actually arise; for scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said' (Kh. Up. VII, 18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any opportunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various elements.
But--it may be said--(that would not be a mere assumption, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman
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capable of modification; for we know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo modifications.--This objection--we reply--is without force, because a number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brahman, teach it to be absolutely changeless (kûtastha). Such passages are, 'This great unborn Self; undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'That Self is to be described by No, no' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 26); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the qualification, 'absolutely changeless' (kûtastha), precludes this. For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.--Moreover, while the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final release, there is nothing to show that any independent result is connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification, passing over into the form of this world. Scripture expressly declares that the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self leads to a result; for in the passage which begins, 'That Self is to be described by No, no,' we read later on, 'O Ganaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then 1 to accept the following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as having no special fruit of its own--as, for instance, the passages about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this
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world--is merely to be applied as a means for the cognition of the absolute Brahman, but does not bring about an independent result; according to the principle that whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connexion with something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the latter  1. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman undergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that) would undergo corresponding modifications  2 would be inappropriate, as the state of filial release (which the soul obtains through the knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.
But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brahman to be changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.--This objection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i.e. those qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a world) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name and form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we maintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, 'From that Self sprang ether,' &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1; is that the creation, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient, omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhâna or any other principle. Thai tenet we have stated in I, 1, 4, and here we do not teach anything contrary to it.--But how, the question may be asked, can you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the absolute unity and non-duality of the Self?--Listen how. Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form, the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either
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as being (i.e. Brahman), nor as different from it 1, the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called inSruti and Smriti the illusion (mâyâ), power (saktî), or nature (prakriti) of the omniscient Lord. Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scriptural passages such as the following, 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and names are contained is Brahman' (Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'Let me evolve names and forms' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He, the wise one, who having divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)' (Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7); 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (Sve. Up. VI, l2).--Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of Nescience; just as the universal ether depends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the limiting adjuncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the so-called gîvas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs (viânâtman), which indeed are one with his own Self--just as the portions of ether enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether--but are limited by aggregates of instruments of action (i.e. bodies) produced from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality none of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also says, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite' (Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 13.) In this manner the Vedânta-texts declare that for him who has reached the
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state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does not exist. The Bhagavadgîtâ also ('The Lord is not the cause of actions, or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord receives no one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance; hence all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gî. V, 14; 15) declares that in reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal world is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgîtâ states; compare Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gî. XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arguna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.' The Sûtrakâra also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the preceding Sûtra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the ocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet having been refuted (i.e. seen to be unreal).--The view of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations on the qualified (saguna) Brahman.
2. And on account of the non-perception of the
others (i.e. the effects of the pradhâna, according to the Sânkhya system).
The principles different from the pradhâna, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sânkhya) Smriti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smriti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense--Smriti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Smriti which is concerned with the effects (i.e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhâna) will be so likewise. This is what the Sûtra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smritis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sânkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.

3. Thereby the Yoga (Smriti) is refuted.
This Sûtra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sânkhya-smriti the Yoga-smriti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhâna as the independent cause of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sûtra does.)--We reply that here an additional
cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for instance, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon 1.' In theSvetâsvatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8).
Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;' 'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-sâstra itself the passage, 'Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the sâstra at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire Yoga-smriti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just as the Smriti referring to the ashtakâs 2.--To this we reply that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed against the Sânkhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-smriti being authoritative, the disagreement (between Smriti and Sruti) on other topics remains as shown above.--Although 3 there are many Smritis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sânkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest
end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sânkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (Sve. Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might be set up for the Sânkhya and Yoga-smritis in their entirety) we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sânkhya-smriti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up. Ill, 8). And the Sânkhya and Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sânkhya and Yoga') the terms 'Sânkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from proximity 1. We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities the Sânkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure; cp. Bri. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrâgaka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c. (Gâbâla Upan. IV).
The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Smritis. If it be said that those Smritis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain
all the same that the truth can be known from the Vedânta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as 'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads' (Bri. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.

4. (Brahman can)not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such, (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.
The objections, founded on Smriti, against the doctrine of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.--But (to raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious duty (dharma),--(To this the pûrvapakshin replies), The analogy between Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties, i.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing, and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so Sruti, if in conflict with other means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter. Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than Sruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge
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of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition--sâkshâtkâra--of Brahman), and as such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like dharma) 1. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of the difference of nature of this (effect)'--The Vedântic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedântin considers as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure, consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is
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gold the material cause of earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character. The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.--This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for nor against any other being. For the Sânkhyas are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking in or giving out anything 1, and are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor  2 is there anything
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to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.--Here somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of the modification 1. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent).--This reasoning--the pûrvapakshin replies--if valid might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between
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[paragraph continues] Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared in the latter part of the Sûtra, 'And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire world--which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c.--must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage, 'It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intelligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman.--But--somebody might again object--the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. 'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (Sat. Br. VI, 1, 3, 2; 4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These prânas when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to Brahman' (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They said to Speech: Do thou sing out for us' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 2).--To this objection the pûrvapakshin replies in the following Sûtra.
5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of the difference and the connexion.
The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are
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not entitled to base the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an intellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke,' &c. because 'there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so? 'On account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand, and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushîtakins in their account of the dispute of the prânas make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order to include the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities contending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these deities having recognised the pre-eminence in prâna' (Kau. Up. II, l4).--And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavâdas, Itihâsas, Purânas, &c. all declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as 'Agni having become Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the passages supplementary to the quarrel of the prânas we read in one place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they went to Pragâpati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence and absence, each of them, as Pragâpati had advised, departing from the body for some time ('They went to their father Pragâpati and said,' &c.; Kh. Up. V, 1, 7); and in another place it is said that they made an offering to prâna (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 13), &c.; all of them proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending
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deities. In the case of such passages as, 'Fire thought,' we must assume that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is connected with its effects as a superintending principle--From all this it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence cannot have it for its material cause.
To this objection raised by the pûrvapakshin the next Sûtra replies.
6. But it is seen.
The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.
Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on account of the difference of its character is not founded on an absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.--But--to state an objection--the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent bodies only of scorpions are the effectsof non-intelligent dung.--Even thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of nature--due to the cause passing over into the effect--between the bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is, on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two) would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and
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cow-dung there is one characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence (sattâ), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).--He, moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must assert that he understands by difference of attributes either the non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other) characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause (for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an effect of Brahman? (The upholder ofBrahman would simply not admit any such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahmanfor its material cause. And that all such assertions are contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the world. It has indeed been maintained by the pûrvapakshin that the other means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman, on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be accomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of
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perception; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holytradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation sprang?' (Rig-v. Samh. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings (îsvara) 1 of extraordinary power and wisdom.
There are also the following Smriti passages to the same effect: 'Do not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable 2;' 'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions of the gods know my origin, not the great rishis. For I myself am in every way the origin of the gods and great rishis' (Bha. Gî. X, 2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the sacredtexts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world; that as the world springs fromBrahman it cannot be separate from Brahman,
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according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &c. 1 The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He 2, moreover, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i. e. the Sânkhya), would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.
If, then, on account of difference of character that which is intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhâna of the Sânkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.--(So much for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.
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7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object).
If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of aneffect which is of an opposite nature, i. e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered as non-existing before its actual origination. But this consequence cannot be acceptable to you--the Vedântin--who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the cause already.
This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation without an object to be negatived. The negation (implied in 'non-existent') can certainly not have for its object the existence of the effectprevious to its origination, since the effect must be viewed as 'existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause; according to such scriptural passages as, 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6). In so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the cause, its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the effect (as after it).--But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as sound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those qualities)!--True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning (of the effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual beginning.--This point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect.
8. On account of such consequences at the time
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of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.
The pûrvapakshin raises further objections.--If an effect which is distinguished by the qualities of grossness, consisting of parts, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c., is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brahman), the effect, by entering into the state of non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties. As therefore--on your doctrine--the cause (i.e. Brahman) as well as the effectis, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.--Another objection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which are actually observed to exist).--A third objection is that, if we assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highestBrahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have obtained final release again appear in the new world.--If you finally say, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing separate from the cause is not possible.--For all these reasons the Vedânta doctrine is objectionable.
To this the next Sûtra replies.
9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.
There is nothing objectionable in our system.--The objection that the effect when being reabsorbed into its
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cause would inquinate the latter with its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are parallel instances,' i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are reabsorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c., which in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay), impart to the latter their individual qualities; nor do golden ornaments impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i. e. gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities to the latter at the time of reabsorption. You (i. e. the pûrvapakshin), on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For reabsorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its individual properties. And 1 that in spite of the non-difference of cause and effectthe effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under II, 1, 14.
Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to the cause at the time of reabsorption is formulated too narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages, as, for instance, 'This everything is that Self' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'The Self is all this' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal Brahman is this before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'All this is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1).
With regard to the case referred to in the Sruti-passages we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the
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effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also.--We can quote other examples in favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the highest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one dreaming person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers knowing the true tradition of the Vedânta have made the following declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of slumber by the beginningless Mâyâ awakes, then it knows the eternal, sleepless, dreamless non-duality' (Gaudap. Kâr. I, 16).
So far we have shown that--on our doctrine--there is no danger of the cause being affected at the time of reabsorption by the qualities of the effect, such as grossness and the like.--With regard to the second objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no special reason for the origin of a new world affected with distinctions, we likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction; nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, 'All these creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a
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wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again' (Kh. Up. VI, 9, 2; 3) For just as during the subsistence of the world the phenomenon of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of all distinction; so, we conclude, there remains, even after reabsorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded on wrong knowledge.--Herewith the objection that--according to our doctrine--even the finally released souls would be born againis already disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong knowledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.--The last alternative finally (which the pûrvapakshin had represented as open to the Vedântin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not admitted by the Vedântins themselves.--Hence the system founded on the Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.
10. And because the objections (raised by the Sânkhya against the Vedânta doctrine) apply to his view also.
The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which he urges against us, viz. in the following manner.--The objection that this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference of character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhâna being the cause of the world; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhâna devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character being thus admitted, the Sânkhya is equally driven to the doctrine that before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover, it being admitted (by the Sânkhya also) that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction from the cause, the case of the Sânkhya here also is the same as ours.--And, further, if
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[paragraph continues] (as the Sânkhya also must admit) at the time of reabsorption the differences of all the special effectsare obliterated and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them; and if you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the pradhâna 1.--It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by the Sânkhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against either only. But as either of the twodoctrines must necessarily be accepted, we are strengthened-—by the outcome of the above discussion--in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real difficulties 2
11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus also there would result non-release.
In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn
by other men; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else; since we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Kanâda, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one another.
But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our reasoning otherwise, i.e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the charge of having no proper foundation. You cannot, after all, maintain that no reasoning whatever is well-founded; for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and the future are uniform.--Further, in the case of passages of Scripture (apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense, can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also expresses himself: 'Perception, inference, and the sâstra according to the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring clearness in regard to right.--He who applies reasoning not contradicted by the Veda to the Veda and the (Smriti) doctrine of law, he, and no other, knows the law' (Manu Smriti XII, 105, 106). And that 'want of foundation', to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjectionable arguments by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments 1. (No fear that because the
pûrvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhânta should be ill-founded too;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid.--For all these reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against reasoning.
Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results 'want of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will result 'want of release,' viz. of the reasoning from this very fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holytexts; for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception, because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge.--Or else (if we adopt another explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity, because it depends on accomplished actually existing things; for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge?--Nor can it be said that he who maintains the
pradhâna to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Sânkhya) is the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.--Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of this our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apartfrom it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to 'absence of final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world.

12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained.
Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedânta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the pradhâna being the cause of the world; (which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.--But now some dull-witted persons might think that another objection founded on reasoning might be raised against the Vedânta, viz. on the ground of the atomic doctrine. The Sûtrakâra, therefore, extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by
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either Manu or Vyâsa or other authorities, are to be considered as 'explained,' i.e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhâna doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same, there is no room for further doubt. Such common arguments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped 'otherwise' (see the preceding Sûtra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on
13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versâ) there would result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.
Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world.--Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and arthavâdas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge 1). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposite 2.--Hence Scripture cannot be acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?' we give you the following
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instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versâ. Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-establisheddistinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.
To the preceding objection we reply, 'It may exist as in ordinary experience.' Even on our philosophic view the distinctionmay exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and, again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered into it,' Taitt. Up. II, 6), still afterBrahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting
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adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.
14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as 'origin' and the like.
The 1 refutation contained in the preceding Sûtra was set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i.e. has no existence apart from the cause.--How so?--'On account of the scriptural word "origin" and others.' The word 'origin' is used in connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thingeverything is known; viz. Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4, 'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely; thus,' &c.--The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay 2, there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual effects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far
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as they are clay they are true.--This parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman; applying the phrase 'having its origin in speech' to the case illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman.--Later on again the text, after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effectsof Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart from them, 'Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Kh. Up. VI, 4, 1).--Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the 'and others' of the Sûtra. Such texts are, 'In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'This everything, all is that Self' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahmanalone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'There is in it no diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).--On any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares). We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty steppe--for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i. e. apart from the surface of the desert 1)--; so this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence apart from Brahman.--But--it might be objected--Brahman has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers
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and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release resulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the element of unity (inBrahman), while the two processes of common worldly activity and of activity according to the Veda--which depend on the karmakânda--may be established in connexion with the element of manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c. agree very well.
This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance (quoted in the Upanishad) the phrase 'as clay they are true' asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase 'having its origin in speech' declares the unreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, 'In that all this has its Self;' and, again, 'That is true;' whereby it is asserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage again, 'That is the Self; thou art that, O Svetaketu!' teaches that the embodied soul (the individual soul) also isBrahman. (And we must note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied soul having its Self inBrahman is self-established, not to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having its Self inBrahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire phenomenal world--which is based on the individual soul--having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in
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addition to the element of unity.--Scriptural passages also (such as, 'When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' Bri. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain states; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows that the general fact of Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state. Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Kh. VI, 16) that the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released, declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called false-minded 1? Another scriptural passage ('from death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity,' Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.--Moreover, on the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the cognition of manifoldness if both are true?
Other objections are started.--If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c., become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has presented itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their validity depends
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does not really exist. And further, the entire body of doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine?
These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without suspecting the perception to be a merely apparent one.--But how (to restate an objection raised above) can the Vedânta-texts if untrue convey information about the true being of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake (i.e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing 1.--This objection, we reply, is without force (because as a matter of fact we do see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,)
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and effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a river take place with regard to a dreaming person.--But, it will be said, these effects themselves are unreal!--These effects themselves, we reply, are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal, but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of them to be unreal likewise.--(We remark in passing that) by this fact of the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be 'considered as refuted  1.--Scripture also (in the passage, 'If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer therefrom success in his work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage, after having declared that from the observation of certain unfavourable omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues 'if somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man kills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, viz. death, is notified.--It is, moreover, known from the experience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the
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[paragraph continues] Self are altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required for full satisfaction 1. An injunction as, for instance, 'He is to sacrifice' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected; but passages such as, 'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else remains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman. Nor can it be maintained that such states of consciousness do not actually arise; for scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said' (Kh. Up. VII, 18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any opportunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various elements.
But--it may be said--(that would not be a mere assumption, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman
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capable of modification; for we know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo modifications.--This objection--we reply--is without force, because a number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brahman, teach it to be absolutely changeless (kûtastha). Such passages are, 'This great unborn Self; undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'That Self is to be described by No, no' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 26); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the qualification, 'absolutely changeless' (kûtastha), precludes this. For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.--Moreover, while the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final release, there is nothing to show that any independent result is connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification, passing over into the form of this world. Scripture expressly declares that the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self leads to a result; for in the passage which begins, 'That Self is to be described by No, no,' we read later on, 'O Ganaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then 1 to accept the following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as having no special fruit of its own--as, for instance, the passages about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this
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world--is merely to be applied as a means for the cognition of the absolute Brahman, but does not bring about an independent result; according to the principle that whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connexion with something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the latter  1. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman undergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that) would undergo corresponding modifications  2 would be inappropriate, as the state of filial release (which the soul obtains through the knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.
But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brahman to be changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.--This objection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i.e. those qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a world) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name and form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we maintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, 'From that Self sprang ether,' &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1; is that the creation, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient, omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhâna or any other principle. Thai tenet we have stated in I, 1, 4, and here we do not teach anything contrary to it.--But how, the question may be asked, can you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the absolute unity and non-duality of the Self?--Listen how. Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form, the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either
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as being (i.e. Brahman), nor as different from it 1, the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called inSruti and Smriti the illusion (mâyâ), power (saktî), or nature (prakriti) of the omniscient Lord. Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scriptural passages such as the following, 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and names are contained is Brahman' (Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'Let me evolve names and forms' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He, the wise one, who having divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)' (Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7); 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (Sve. Up. VI, l2).--Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of Nescience; just as the universal ether depends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the limiting adjuncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the so-called gîvas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs (viânâtman), which indeed are one with his own Self--just as the portions of ether enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether--but are limited by aggregates of instruments of action (i.e. bodies) produced from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality none of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also says, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite' (Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 13.) In this manner the Vedânta-texts declare that for him who has reached the
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state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does not exist. The Bhagavadgîtâ also ('The Lord is not the cause of actions, or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord receives no one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance; hence all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gî. V, 14; 15) declares that in reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal world is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgîtâ states; compare Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gî. XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arguna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.' The Sûtrakâra also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the preceding Sûtra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the ocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet having been refuted (i.e. seen to be unreal).--The view of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations on the qualified (saguna) Brahman.
15. And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed.
For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads exist. That it is not a general rule that when one thing exists another is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists; for in that case non-difference
does not exist, although the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its effect 1.--But--it may be objected--even in the case of things other (i.e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly depends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed only when fire exists.--We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been extinguished; as, for instance, in the case ofsmoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.--Well, then--the objector will say--let us add to smoke a certain qualificationenabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind 2 does not exist unless fire exists.--Even thus, we reply, your objection is not valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the non-difference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ (buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly 3. And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.--Or else we have to read (in the Sûtra) 'bhâvât,' and to translate, 'and on account of the existence or observation.' The non-difference of cause and effect results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of perception. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not perceive a thing called 'cloth,' in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggregate
of which is identical with the grosser threads), in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Kh. Up. VI, 4); those, again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the world; not to pradhâna, &c.), we have already explained.

16. And on account of that which is posterior (i. e. the effect) being that which is.
For the following reason also the effect is to be considered as non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i.e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For in passages like,' In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which is' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3); and, 'Verily, in the beginning this was Self, one only' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, i, i), the effect which is denoted by the word 'this' appears in grammatical co-ordination with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing; for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different from the cause. As the cause, i e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore the effect is non-different from the cause.
17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply) not so, (because
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the term 'that which is not' denotes) another quality (merely); (as appears) from the complementary sentence.
But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the effect before its production as that which is not; so, for instance, 'In the beginning this was that only which is not' (Kh. Up. III, 19, 1); and 'Non-existent 1 indeed this wasin the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its production.
This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its production is not meant absolute Non-existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning is determined by itscomplementary part. With reference to the passage. 'In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that what is there denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is--in the complementary passage, 'That became existent'--referred to by the word 'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'
The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time.--Hence with reference to the other passage also, 'Non-existing indeed,' &c., thecomplementary part, 'That made itself its Self,' shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute Non-existence is not meant.--It follows from all this that the designation of 'Non-existence' applied to the effect before its production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those things which are distinguished
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by name and form are in ordinary language called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation.
18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.
That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural passage.
We at first set forth the argumentation.--Ordinary experience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain determined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in anycausal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well?--Let us then maintain, the asatkâryavâdin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (atisaya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.--What, we ask in return, do you understand by that 'atisaya?' If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the atisaya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can
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determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that power.--Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called samavâya connexion 1.--If, we reply, you assume the samavâya connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the samavâya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by samavâya, and then that connexion will again require a new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of connexions; or else you will have to maintain that the samavâya is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of the samavâya relation 2.--Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the samavâya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion.--Then, we reply, conjunction (samyoga) also must be connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the samavâya
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connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion 1.--Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the samavâya relation has really no purport.
In what manner again do you--who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavâya relation--assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part?--If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended.--Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts 2.--In that case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain
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given parts we should always have to assume further parts  1.--Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular part.--That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than Devadatta can be present in Srughna and in Pâtaliputra on one and the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yagñadatta, who, as being two different persons, may live one of them at Srughna and the other at Pâtaliputra.--If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part. If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail. But such things are not seen to take place.
We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause.--That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and as such requires an agent  2, just as the action of walking does. To speak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction.
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[paragraph continues] But if you deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something else, and again that when the origination of the two halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is originated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative) causes are originated  1.' But as a matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in existence.--Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self.--How, we ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use, for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Pûrnavarman,' the declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal
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agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman ace both equally non-entities and can never be.--But, the asatkâryavâdin here objects, from your doctrine there follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether useless that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its origination.--Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown above.--Nor does a substance become another substance merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c., remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial beings, because the different states in which they appear are not separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after
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the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.
It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are illegitimately used.--The preceding arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only 1.
The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results something else
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[paragraph continues] (viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a certain relative power (atisaya) of the inherent cause; he thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists in the cause already.
We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world.
The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding Sûtra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sûtra is the one (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That passage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its origination, coordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,' proves that the effect exists in--and is non-different from--the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its cause by samavâya, it would be something different from the cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c.
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[paragraph continues] (VI, 1, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in--and is not different from--the cause.
19. And like a piece of cloth.
As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.--Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we conclude that the latter is non-different from the former.
20. And as in the case of the different vital airs.
It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different kinds of vital air--such as prâna the ascending vital air, apâna the descending vital air, &c.--are suspended, in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects, such as thebending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped. When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects also are brought about, in addition to mere life.--Nor must the vital airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as something else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common character. Thus (i. e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived.--As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and
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non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage that 'What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived, what is not known is known' (Kh. Up. VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled  1.
21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated (as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.--If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent cause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account of the other being designated.' For Scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman, as is shown by the passage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O Svetaketu!' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7.)--Or else (if we interpret 'the other' of the Sûtra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i. e. Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, 'Having created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i. e. the unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage also, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names and forms' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates the living (soul) by the word 'Self,' shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an independent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death, old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself absolutely stainless,
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look on this altogether unclean body as forming part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Further, it would remember that it had created this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what would be beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.
22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.
The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.--We rather declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i. e. different from the embodied Self, is the creativeprinciple of the world. The faults specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not attach to thatBrahman; for as eternal freedom is its characteristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator of the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For scriptural passages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' Bri. Up. II, 4, 5; 'The Self we must search out, we must try to understand,' Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1; 'Then he becomes
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united with the True,' Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self mounted by the intelligent Self,' Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.--And if it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of non-difference (for instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a jar.--Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration of non-difference contained in such passages as 'that art thou.' the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative quality ofBrahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the non-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and so on, which spring from name and form the presentationsof Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once. The illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows from passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 'That we must search for,' &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul; whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.
23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be established.
As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth, nevertheless great variety is observed, some being
precious gems, such as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like, being of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at dogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandalwood and cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces various effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) cannot be maintained.--Further 1 arguments are furnished by the fact of all effect having, as Scripture declares, their origin in speech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream phantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).
24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so Brahman does).
Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and the like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto by providing themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs, wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be without any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing itself with instruments to work with? We therefore maintain that Brahman is not the cause of the world.
This objection is not valid, because causation is possible
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in consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal substance, as in the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice respectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of Brahman also. And if you object to this analogy for the reason that milk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent, viz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat. If milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel it to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is merely completed. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other hand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus Scripture also declares, 'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (Sve. Up. VI, 8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.
25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in ordinary experience.
Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent things have the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the other hand, that intelligent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed to their several work only after having provided themselves with a complete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman, which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any auxiliary?
We reply, 'Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, rishis, and other beings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without availing themselves of any
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extraneous means, by their mere intention, which is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power--a fact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, and purânas;--and as the spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female crane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond to another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman also may be assumed to create the world by itself without extraneous means.
Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following style.--The gods and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel instances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For the material causes operative in the production of palaces and other material things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent Selfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which, owing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree of consistency. And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of thunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling intelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually to move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being 1; it rather wanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as the creeper climbs up the tree.--Hence all these illustrative examples cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.
To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters, &c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the other side, possess the common attribute of intelligence, potters require for their work extraneous means (i.e. means lying outside their bodies) and gods do not. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require no extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is to point out that a peculiarly conditioned capability which
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is observed in some one case (as in that of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other cases also.
26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of thetexts declaring Brahman to be without parts.
Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one, without a second, modifying itself without theemployment of any extraneous means, is the cause of the world.--Now, another objection is raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under discussion.--The consequence of the Vedânta doctrine, it is said, will be that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its effects, because it is not composed of parts. IfBrahman, like earth and other matter, consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it undergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But Scripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare, 'He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Sve. Up. VI, 19); 'That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12); 'He is to be described by No, no' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 2,6); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of any distinctions in Brahman.--As, therefore, a partial modification is impossible, a modification of the entire Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves a cutting off ofBrahman from its very basis.--Another consequence of the Vedântic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive 'to see'Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen without any endeavour, and apart from them noBrahman exists.--And, finally, the texts declaring Brahman to be unborn are contradicted thereby.--If, on the other hand--in order to escape from these difficulties--we assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do violence to thosetexts which declare Brahman not to be made up of parts.
Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is non-eternal.--Hence the Vedântic point of view cannot be maintained in any way.

27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).
The word 'but' discards the objection.--We deny this and maintain that our view is not open to any objections.--That the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 'on account of sacred texts.' For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from itseffects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of cause and effect ('That divinity thought) let me enter into these three divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (Kh. Up. III, 12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the passage, 'then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of place; since the individual soul is always united with the effects ofBrahman, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahmanbecoming the object of perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman has to be. admitted.--Nor do we violate those texts which declareBrahman to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just because Scripture reveals it. For Brahmanwhich rests exclusively on the holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are authoritative--
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not the senses, and so on--must be accepted such as the texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought! As the Purâna says: 'Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above all material causes 1.' Therefore the cognition of what is supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.
But--our opponent will say--even the holy texts cannot make us understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions 'at the atirâtra he is to take the shodasin-cup,' and 'at the atirâtra he is not to take the shodasin-cup') any contradiction which may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.
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No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts.--Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahmanas undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world; that being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own. For in the scriptural passage beginning 'He can only be described by No, no' (which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in the words 'O Ganaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4).--Hence our view does not involve any real difficulties.
28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods 1, &c.).
Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self
of a dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahmanalso, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity.

29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise.
Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhâna implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhâna--is the cause of an effect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that doctrine also either that the pradhâna as not consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in favour of the Sânkhyas--they do not maintain their pradhâna to be without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the three gunas, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhâna forms a whole containing the three gunas as its parts.--We reply that such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without parts 1. And each guna by itself assisted merely by the two other gunas constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature 2.--So that the objection lies against the Sânkhya
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view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhâna rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhâna consists of parts.--If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhâna cannot be eternal, and so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhâna to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman.
The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do not get beyond the first atom  1 If, on the other hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.
As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.
30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).
We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various powers.--How then--it may be asked--do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed with various powers?-He is, we reply, endowed with all powers, 'because that is seen.' For various scriptural passages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers, 'He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is
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never surprised' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 4); 'He who desires what is true and imagines what is true' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail') (Mu. Up. I,1,9); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gârgî, sun and moon stand apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9); and other similar passages.
31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).
Let this be granted.--Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action 1; so, for instance, in the passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know (from mantras, arthavâdas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, 'No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?
The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands, hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' Sve. Up. III, 19) declares that Brahman
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although devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible capacities.
32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings engaging in any action) having a motive.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.--The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, 'on account of actions having a purpose.'--We know from ordinary experience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage confirming this result of common experience, 'Verily everything is not dear that you may have everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various contents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of activity also.--Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intelligent person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created this world without any motive.--That, we reply, would contradict the omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by Scripture.--Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent Being is untenable.

33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life.
The word 'but' discards the objection raised.--We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of highposition who have no unfulfilled desires left have no
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reference to any extraneous purpose; but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature 1, without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned 2--Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.--Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for Scripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.
34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of
his regarding (merit and demerit); for so (Scripture) declares.
In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.--The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy; to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord affirmed by Sruti and Smriti. Moreover, as the infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty, a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty, "because he is bound by regards." If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation, he would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards, i. e. he has to look to merit and demerit. Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of Parganya, the Giver of rain. For as Parganya is the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences between these classes of beings
are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.--And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'For he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kaush. Up. III, 8) 1; and, 'A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work' (Bri. Up. III, 2, 13). Smriti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so, for instance, 'I serve men in the way in which they approach me' (Bha. Gî. IV, 11).
35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.
But--an objection is raised-the passage, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second,' affirms that before the creation there was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular reasoning that work depends on diversity of
condition of life, and diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as acting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen; but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it follows that the first creation must have been free, from inequalities.
This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is without beginning.--The objection would be valid if the world had a beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore no logical objection to their operation.--To the question how we know that the world is without a beginning, the next Sûtra replies.

36. (The beginninglessness of the world; recommends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).
The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to acquire in the doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad action. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, and it is of a uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from action produced by the mental impressions or wrath, hatred, and other afflicting passions 1. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be formed; so that--on the doctrine
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of the world having a beginning-we are led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand, explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains.--Moreover, the fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in Sruti and Smriti. In the first place, we have the scriptural passage, 'Let me enter with this living Self (gîva), &c. (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to creation, 'the living Self'--a name applying to it in so far as it is the sustaining principle of the prânas--shows that this phenomenal world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the prânas would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world's beginning, by a name which depends on the existence of those prânas. Nor can it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the prânas; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than a mere future relation.--Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As the creator formerly devised (akalpayat) sun and moon (Ri. Samh. X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Smriti also declares the world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its beginning, nor its support' (Bha. Gî. XV, 3). And the Purâna also declares that there is no measure of the past and the future Kalpas.
37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).
The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.
Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which
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it was to show why his view should be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Mâyâ,--on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.


2. And on account of the non-perception of the
others (i.e. the effects of the pradhâna, according to the Sânkhya system).
The principles different from the pradhâna, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sânkhya) Smriti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smriti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense--Smriti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Smriti which is concerned with the effects (i.e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhâna) will be so likewise. This is what the Sûtra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smritis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sânkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.

3. Thereby the Yoga (Smriti) is refuted.
This Sûtra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sânkhya-smriti the Yoga-smriti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhâna as the independent cause of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sûtra does.)--We reply that here an additional
cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for instance, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon 1.' In theSvetâsvatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8).
Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;' 'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-sâstra itself the passage, 'Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the sâstra at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire Yoga-smriti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just as the Smriti referring to the ashtakâs 2.--To this we reply that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed against the Sânkhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-smriti being authoritative, the disagreement (between Smriti and Sruti) on other topics remains as shown above.--Although 3 there are many Smritis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sânkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest
end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sânkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (Sve. Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might be set up for the Sânkhya and Yoga-smritis in their entirety) we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sânkhya-smriti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up. Ill, 8). And the Sânkhya and Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sânkhya and Yoga') the terms 'Sânkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from proximity 1. We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities the Sânkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure; cp. Bri. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrâgaka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c. (Gâbâla Upan. IV).
The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Smritis. If it be said that those Smritis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain
all the same that the truth can be known from the Vedânta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as 'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads' (Bri. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.

4. (Brahman can)not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such, (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.
The objections, founded on Smriti, against the doctrine of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.--But (to raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious duty (dharma),--(To this the pûrvapakshin replies), The analogy between Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties, i.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing, and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so Sruti, if in conflict with other means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter. Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than Sruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge
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of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition--sâkshâtkâra--of Brahman), and as such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like dharma) 1. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of the difference of nature of this (effect)'--The Vedântic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedântin considers as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure, consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is
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gold the material cause of earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character. The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.--This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for nor against any other being. For the Sânkhyas are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking in or giving out anything 1, and are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor  2 is there anything
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to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.--Here somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of the modification 1. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent).--This reasoning--the pûrvapakshin replies--if valid might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between
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[paragraph continues] Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared in the latter part of the Sûtra, 'And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire world--which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c.--must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage, 'It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intelligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman.--But--somebody might again object--the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. 'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (Sat. Br. VI, 1, 3, 2; 4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These prânas when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to Brahman' (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They said to Speech: Do thou sing out for us' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 2).--To this objection the pûrvapakshin replies in the following Sûtra.
5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of the difference and the connexion.
The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are
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not entitled to base the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an intellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke,' &c. because 'there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so? 'On account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand, and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushîtakins in their account of the dispute of the prânas make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order to include the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities contending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these deities having recognised the pre-eminence in prâna' (Kau. Up. II, l4).--And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavâdas, Itihâsas, Purânas, &c. all declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as 'Agni having become Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the passages supplementary to the quarrel of the prânas we read in one place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they went to Pragâpati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence and absence, each of them, as Pragâpati had advised, departing from the body for some time ('They went to their father Pragâpati and said,' &c.; Kh. Up. V, 1, 7); and in another place it is said that they made an offering to prâna (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 13), &c.; all of them proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending
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deities. In the case of such passages as, 'Fire thought,' we must assume that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is connected with its effects as a superintending principle--From all this it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence cannot have it for its material cause.
To this objection raised by the pûrvapakshin the next Sûtra replies.
6. But it is seen.
The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.
Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on account of the difference of its character is not founded on an absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.--But--to state an objection--the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent bodies only of scorpions are the effectsof non-intelligent dung.--Even thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of nature--due to the cause passing over into the effect--between the bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is, on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two) would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and
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cow-dung there is one characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence (sattâ), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).--He, moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must assert that he understands by difference of attributes either the non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other) characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause (for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an effect of Brahman? (The upholder ofBrahman would simply not admit any such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahmanfor its material cause. And that all such assertions are contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the world. It has indeed been maintained by the pûrvapakshin that the other means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman, on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be accomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of
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perception; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holytradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation sprang?' (Rig-v. Samh. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings (îsvara) 1 of extraordinary power and wisdom.
There are also the following Smriti passages to the same effect: 'Do not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable 2;' 'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions of the gods know my origin, not the great rishis. For I myself am in every way the origin of the gods and great rishis' (Bha. Gî. X, 2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the sacredtexts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world; that as the world springs fromBrahman it cannot be separate from Brahman,
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according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &c. 1 The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He 2, moreover, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i. e. the Sânkhya), would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.
If, then, on account of difference of character that which is intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhâna of the Sânkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.--(So much for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.
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7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object).
If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of aneffect which is of an opposite nature, i. e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered as non-existing before its actual origination. But this consequence cannot be acceptable to you--the Vedântin--who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the cause already.
This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation without an object to be negatived. The negation (implied in 'non-existent') can certainly not have for its object the existence of the effectprevious to its origination, since the effect must be viewed as 'existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause; according to such scriptural passages as, 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6). In so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the cause, its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the effect (as after it).--But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as sound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those qualities)!--True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning (of the effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual beginning.--This point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect.
8. On account of such consequences at the time
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of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.
The pûrvapakshin raises further objections.--If an effect which is distinguished by the qualities of grossness, consisting of parts, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c., is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brahman), the effect, by entering into the state of non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties. As therefore--on your doctrine--the cause (i.e. Brahman) as well as the effectis, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.--Another objection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which are actually observed to exist).--A third objection is that, if we assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highestBrahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have obtained final release again appear in the new world.--If you finally say, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing separate from the cause is not possible.--For all these reasons the Vedânta doctrine is objectionable.
To this the next Sûtra replies.
9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.
There is nothing objectionable in our system.--The objection that the effect when being reabsorbed into its
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cause would inquinate the latter with its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are parallel instances,' i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are reabsorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c., which in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay), impart to the latter their individual qualities; nor do golden ornaments impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i. e. gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities to the latter at the time of reabsorption. You (i. e. the pûrvapakshin), on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For reabsorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its individual properties. And 1 that in spite of the non-difference of cause and effectthe effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under II, 1, 14.
Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to the cause at the time of reabsorption is formulated too narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages, as, for instance, 'This everything is that Self' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'The Self is all this' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal Brahman is this before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'All this is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1).
With regard to the case referred to in the Sruti-passages we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the
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effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also.--We can quote other examples in favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the highest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one dreaming person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers knowing the true tradition of the Vedânta have made the following declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of slumber by the beginningless Mâyâ awakes, then it knows the eternal, sleepless, dreamless non-duality' (Gaudap. Kâr. I, 16).
So far we have shown that--on our doctrine--there is no danger of the cause being affected at the time of reabsorption by the qualities of the effect, such as grossness and the like.--With regard to the second objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no special reason for the origin of a new world affected with distinctions, we likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction; nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, 'All these creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a
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wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again' (Kh. Up. VI, 9, 2; 3) For just as during the subsistence of the world the phenomenon of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of all distinction; so, we conclude, there remains, even after reabsorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded on wrong knowledge.--Herewith the objection that--according to our doctrine--even the finally released souls would be born againis already disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong knowledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.--The last alternative finally (which the pûrvapakshin had represented as open to the Vedântin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not admitted by the Vedântins themselves.--Hence the system founded on the Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.
10. And because the objections (raised by the Sânkhya against the Vedânta doctrine) apply to his view also.
The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which he urges against us, viz. in the following manner.--The objection that this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference of character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhâna being the cause of the world; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhâna devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character being thus admitted, the Sânkhya is equally driven to the doctrine that before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover, it being admitted (by the Sânkhya also) that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction from the cause, the case of the Sânkhya here also is the same as ours.--And, further, if
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[paragraph continues] (as the Sânkhya also must admit) at the time of reabsorption the differences of all the special effectsare obliterated and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them; and if you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the pradhâna 1.--It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by the Sânkhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against either only. But as either of the twodoctrines must necessarily be accepted, we are strengthened-—by the outcome of the above discussion--in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real difficulties 2
11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus also there would result non-release.
In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn
by other men; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else; since we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Kanâda, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one another.
But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our reasoning otherwise, i.e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the charge of having no proper foundation. You cannot, after all, maintain that no reasoning whatever is well-founded; for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and the future are uniform.--Further, in the case of passages of Scripture (apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense, can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also expresses himself: 'Perception, inference, and the sâstra according to the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring clearness in regard to right.--He who applies reasoning not contradicted by the Veda to the Veda and the (Smriti) doctrine of law, he, and no other, knows the law' (Manu Smriti XII, 105, 106). And that 'want of foundation', to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjectionable arguments by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments 1. (No fear that because the
pûrvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhânta should be ill-founded too;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid.--For all these reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against reasoning.
Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results 'want of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will result 'want of release,' viz. of the reasoning from this very fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holytexts; for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception, because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge.--Or else (if we adopt another explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity, because it depends on accomplished actually existing things; for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge?--Nor can it be said that he who maintains the
pradhâna to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Sânkhya) is the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.--Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of this our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apartfrom it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to 'absence of final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world.

12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained.
Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedânta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the pradhâna being the cause of the world; (which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.--But now some dull-witted persons might think that another objection founded on reasoning might be raised against the Vedânta, viz. on the ground of the atomic doctrine. The Sûtrakâra, therefore, extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by
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either Manu or Vyâsa or other authorities, are to be considered as 'explained,' i.e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhâna doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same, there is no room for further doubt. Such common arguments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped 'otherwise' (see the preceding Sûtra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on
13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versâ) there would result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.
Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world.--Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and arthavâdas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge 1). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposite 2.--Hence Scripture cannot be acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?' we give you the following
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instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versâ. Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-establisheddistinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.
To the preceding objection we reply, 'It may exist as in ordinary experience.' Even on our philosophic view the distinctionmay exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and, again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered into it,' Taitt. Up. II, 6), still afterBrahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting
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adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.
14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as 'origin' and the like.
The 1 refutation contained in the preceding Sûtra was set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i.e. has no existence apart from the cause.--How so?--'On account of the scriptural word "origin" and others.' The word 'origin' is used in connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thingeverything is known; viz. Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4, 'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely; thus,' &c.--The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay 2, there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual effects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far
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as they are clay they are true.--This parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman; applying the phrase 'having its origin in speech' to the case illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman.--Later on again the text, after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effectsof Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart from them, 'Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Kh. Up. VI, 4, 1).--Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the 'and others' of the Sûtra. Such texts are, 'In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'This everything, all is that Self' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahmanalone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'There is in it no diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).--On any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares). We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty steppe--for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i. e. apart from the surface of the desert 1)--; so this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence apart from Brahman.--But--it might be objected--Brahman has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers
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and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release resulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the element of unity (inBrahman), while the two processes of common worldly activity and of activity according to the Veda--which depend on the karmakânda--may be established in connexion with the element of manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c. agree very well.
This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance (quoted in the Upanishad) the phrase 'as clay they are true' asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase 'having its origin in speech' declares the unreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, 'In that all this has its Self;' and, again, 'That is true;' whereby it is asserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage again, 'That is the Self; thou art that, O Svetaketu!' teaches that the embodied soul (the individual soul) also isBrahman. (And we must note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied soul having its Self inBrahman is self-established, not to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having its Self inBrahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire phenomenal world--which is based on the individual soul--having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in
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addition to the element of unity.--Scriptural passages also (such as, 'When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' Bri. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain states; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows that the general fact of Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state. Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Kh. VI, 16) that the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released, declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called false-minded 1? Another scriptural passage ('from death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity,' Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.--Moreover, on the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the cognition of manifoldness if both are true?
Other objections are started.--If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c., become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has presented itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their validity depends
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does not really exist. And further, the entire body of doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine?
These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without suspecting the perception to be a merely apparent one.--But how (to restate an objection raised above) can the Vedânta-texts if untrue convey information about the true being of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake (i.e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing 1.--This objection, we reply, is without force (because as a matter of fact we do see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,)
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and effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a river take place with regard to a dreaming person.--But, it will be said, these effects themselves are unreal!--These effects themselves, we reply, are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal, but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of them to be unreal likewise.--(We remark in passing that) by this fact of the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be 'considered as refuted  1.--Scripture also (in the passage, 'If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer therefrom success in his work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage, after having declared that from the observation of certain unfavourable omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues 'if somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man kills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, viz. death, is notified.--It is, moreover, known from the experience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the
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[paragraph continues] Self are altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required for full satisfaction 1. An injunction as, for instance, 'He is to sacrifice' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected; but passages such as, 'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else remains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman. Nor can it be maintained that such states of consciousness do not actually arise; for scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said' (Kh. Up. VII, 18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any opportunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various elements.
But--it may be said--(that would not be a mere assumption, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman
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capable of modification; for we know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo modifications.--This objection--we reply--is without force, because a number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brahman, teach it to be absolutely changeless (kûtastha). Such passages are, 'This great unborn Self; undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'That Self is to be described by No, no' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 26); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the qualification, 'absolutely changeless' (kûtastha), precludes this. For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.--Moreover, while the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final release, there is nothing to show that any independent result is connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification, passing over into the form of this world. Scripture expressly declares that the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self leads to a result; for in the passage which begins, 'That Self is to be described by No, no,' we read later on, 'O Ganaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then 1 to accept the following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as having no special fruit of its own--as, for instance, the passages about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this
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world--is merely to be applied as a means for the cognition of the absolute Brahman, but does not bring about an independent result; according to the principle that whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connexion with something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the latter  1. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman undergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that) would undergo corresponding modifications  2 would be inappropriate, as the state of filial release (which the soul obtains through the knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.
But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brahman to be changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.--This objection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i.e. those qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a world) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name and form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we maintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, 'From that Self sprang ether,' &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1; is that the creation, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient, omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhâna or any other principle. Thai tenet we have stated in I, 1, 4, and here we do not teach anything contrary to it.--But how, the question may be asked, can you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the absolute unity and non-duality of the Self?--Listen how. Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form, the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either
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as being (i.e. Brahman), nor as different from it 1, the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called inSruti and Smriti the illusion (mâyâ), power (saktî), or nature (prakriti) of the omniscient Lord. Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scriptural passages such as the following, 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and names are contained is Brahman' (Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'Let me evolve names and forms' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He, the wise one, who having divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)' (Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7); 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (Sve. Up. VI, l2).--Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of Nescience; just as the universal ether depends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the limiting adjuncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the so-called gîvas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs (viânâtman), which indeed are one with his own Self--just as the portions of ether enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether--but are limited by aggregates of instruments of action (i.e. bodies) produced from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality none of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also says, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite' (Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 13.) In this manner the Vedânta-texts declare that for him who has reached the
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state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does not exist. The Bhagavadgîtâ also ('The Lord is not the cause of actions, or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord receives no one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance; hence all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gî. V, 14; 15) declares that in reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal world is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgîtâ states; compare Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gî. XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arguna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.' The Sûtrakâra also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the preceding Sûtra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the ocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet having been refuted (i.e. seen to be unreal).--The view of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations on the qualified (saguna) Brahman.
15. And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed.
For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads exist. That it is not a general rule that when one thing exists another is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists; for in that case non-difference
does not exist, although the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its effect 1.--But--it may be objected--even in the case of things other (i.e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly depends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed only when fire exists.--We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been extinguished; as, for instance, in the case ofsmoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.--Well, then--the objector will say--let us add to smoke a certain qualificationenabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind 2 does not exist unless fire exists.--Even thus, we reply, your objection is not valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the non-difference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ (buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly 3. And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.--Or else we have to read (in the Sûtra) 'bhâvât,' and to translate, 'and on account of the existence or observation.' The non-difference of cause and effect results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of perception. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not perceive a thing called 'cloth,' in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggregate
of which is identical with the grosser threads), in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Kh. Up. VI, 4); those, again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the world; not to pradhâna, &c.), we have already explained.

16. And on account of that which is posterior (i. e. the effect) being that which is.
For the following reason also the effect is to be considered as non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i.e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For in passages like,' In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which is' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3); and, 'Verily, in the beginning this was Self, one only' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, i, i), the effect which is denoted by the word 'this' appears in grammatical co-ordination with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing; for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different from the cause. As the cause, i e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore the effect is non-different from the cause.
17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply) not so, (because
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the term 'that which is not' denotes) another quality (merely); (as appears) from the complementary sentence.
But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the effect before its production as that which is not; so, for instance, 'In the beginning this was that only which is not' (Kh. Up. III, 19, 1); and 'Non-existent 1 indeed this wasin the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its production.
This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its production is not meant absolute Non-existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning is determined by itscomplementary part. With reference to the passage. 'In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that what is there denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is--in the complementary passage, 'That became existent'--referred to by the word 'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'
The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time.--Hence with reference to the other passage also, 'Non-existing indeed,' &c., thecomplementary part, 'That made itself its Self,' shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute Non-existence is not meant.--It follows from all this that the designation of 'Non-existence' applied to the effect before its production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those things which are distinguished
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by name and form are in ordinary language called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation.
18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.
That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural passage.
We at first set forth the argumentation.--Ordinary experience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain determined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in anycausal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well?--Let us then maintain, the asatkâryavâdin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (atisaya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.--What, we ask in return, do you understand by that 'atisaya?' If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the atisaya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can
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determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that power.--Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called samavâya connexion 1.--If, we reply, you assume the samavâya connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the samavâya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by samavâya, and then that connexion will again require a new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of connexions; or else you will have to maintain that the samavâya is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of the samavâya relation 2.--Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the samavâya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion.--Then, we reply, conjunction (samyoga) also must be connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the samavâya
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connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion 1.--Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the samavâya relation has really no purport.
In what manner again do you--who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavâya relation--assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part?--If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended.--Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts 2.--In that case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain
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given parts we should always have to assume further parts  1.--Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular part.--That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than Devadatta can be present in Srughna and in Pâtaliputra on one and the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yagñadatta, who, as being two different persons, may live one of them at Srughna and the other at Pâtaliputra.--If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part. If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail. But such things are not seen to take place.
We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause.--That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and as such requires an agent  2, just as the action of walking does. To speak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction.
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[paragraph continues] But if you deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something else, and again that when the origination of the two halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is originated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative) causes are originated  1.' But as a matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in existence.--Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self.--How, we ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use, for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Pûrnavarman,' the declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal
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agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman ace both equally non-entities and can never be.--But, the asatkâryavâdin here objects, from your doctrine there follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether useless that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its origination.--Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown above.--Nor does a substance become another substance merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c., remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial beings, because the different states in which they appear are not separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after
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the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.
It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are illegitimately used.--The preceding arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only 1.
The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results something else
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[paragraph continues] (viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a certain relative power (atisaya) of the inherent cause; he thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists in the cause already.
We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world.
The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding Sûtra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sûtra is the one (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That passage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its origination, coordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,' proves that the effect exists in--and is non-different from--the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its cause by samavâya, it would be something different from the cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c.
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[paragraph continues] (VI, 1, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in--and is not different from--the cause.
19. And like a piece of cloth.
As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.--Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we conclude that the latter is non-different from the former.
20. And as in the case of the different vital airs.
It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different kinds of vital air--such as prâna the ascending vital air, apâna the descending vital air, &c.--are suspended, in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects, such as thebending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped. When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects also are brought about, in addition to mere life.--Nor must the vital airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as something else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common character. Thus (i. e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived.--As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and
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non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage that 'What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived, what is not known is known' (Kh. Up. VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled  1.
21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated (as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.--If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent cause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account of the other being designated.' For Scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman, as is shown by the passage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O Svetaketu!' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7.)--Or else (if we interpret 'the other' of the Sûtra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i. e. Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, 'Having created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i. e. the unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage also, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names and forms' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates the living (soul) by the word 'Self,' shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an independent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death, old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself absolutely stainless,
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look on this altogether unclean body as forming part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Further, it would remember that it had created this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what would be beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.
22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.
The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.--We rather declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i. e. different from the embodied Self, is the creativeprinciple of the world. The faults specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not attach to thatBrahman; for as eternal freedom is its characteristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator of the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For scriptural passages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' Bri. Up. II, 4, 5; 'The Self we must search out, we must try to understand,' Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1; 'Then he becomes
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united with the True,' Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self mounted by the intelligent Self,' Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.--And if it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of non-difference (for instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a jar.--Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration of non-difference contained in such passages as 'that art thou.' the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative quality ofBrahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the non-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and so on, which spring from name and form the presentationsof Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once. The illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows from passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 'That we must search for,' &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul; whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.
23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be established.
As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth, nevertheless great variety is observed, some being
precious gems, such as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like, being of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at dogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandalwood and cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces various effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) cannot be maintained.--Further 1 arguments are furnished by the fact of all effect having, as Scripture declares, their origin in speech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream phantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).
24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so Brahman does).
Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and the like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto by providing themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs, wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be without any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing itself with instruments to work with? We therefore maintain that Brahman is not the cause of the world.
This objection is not valid, because causation is possible
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in consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal substance, as in the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice respectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of Brahman also. And if you object to this analogy for the reason that milk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent, viz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat. If milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel it to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is merely completed. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other hand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus Scripture also declares, 'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (Sve. Up. VI, 8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.
25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in ordinary experience.
Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent things have the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the other hand, that intelligent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed to their several work only after having provided themselves with a complete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman, which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any auxiliary?
We reply, 'Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, rishis, and other beings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without availing themselves of any
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extraneous means, by their mere intention, which is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power--a fact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, and purânas;--and as the spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female crane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond to another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman also may be assumed to create the world by itself without extraneous means.
Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following style.--The gods and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel instances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For the material causes operative in the production of palaces and other material things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent Selfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which, owing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree of consistency. And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of thunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling intelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually to move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being 1; it rather wanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as the creeper climbs up the tree.--Hence all these illustrative examples cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.
To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters, &c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the other side, possess the common attribute of intelligence, potters require for their work extraneous means (i.e. means lying outside their bodies) and gods do not. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require no extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is to point out that a peculiarly conditioned capability which
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is observed in some one case (as in that of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other cases also.
26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of thetexts declaring Brahman to be without parts.
Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one, without a second, modifying itself without theemployment of any extraneous means, is the cause of the world.--Now, another objection is raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under discussion.--The consequence of the Vedânta doctrine, it is said, will be that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its effects, because it is not composed of parts. IfBrahman, like earth and other matter, consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it undergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But Scripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare, 'He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Sve. Up. VI, 19); 'That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12); 'He is to be described by No, no' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 2,6); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of any distinctions in Brahman.--As, therefore, a partial modification is impossible, a modification of the entire Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves a cutting off ofBrahman from its very basis.--Another consequence of the Vedântic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive 'to see'Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen without any endeavour, and apart from them noBrahman exists.--And, finally, the texts declaring Brahman to be unborn are contradicted thereby.--If, on the other hand--in order to escape from these difficulties--we assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do violence to thosetexts which declare Brahman not to be made up of parts.
Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is non-eternal.--Hence the Vedântic point of view cannot be maintained in any way.

27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).
The word 'but' discards the objection.--We deny this and maintain that our view is not open to any objections.--That the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 'on account of sacred texts.' For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from itseffects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of cause and effect ('That divinity thought) let me enter into these three divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (Kh. Up. III, 12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the passage, 'then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of place; since the individual soul is always united with the effects ofBrahman, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahmanbecoming the object of perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman has to be. admitted.--Nor do we violate those texts which declareBrahman to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just because Scripture reveals it. For Brahmanwhich rests exclusively on the holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are authoritative--
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not the senses, and so on--must be accepted such as the texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought! As the Purâna says: 'Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above all material causes 1.' Therefore the cognition of what is supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.
But--our opponent will say--even the holy texts cannot make us understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions 'at the atirâtra he is to take the shodasin-cup,' and 'at the atirâtra he is not to take the shodasin-cup') any contradiction which may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.
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No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts.--Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahmanas undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world; that being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own. For in the scriptural passage beginning 'He can only be described by No, no' (which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in the words 'O Ganaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4).--Hence our view does not involve any real difficulties.
28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods 1, &c.).
Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self
of a dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahmanalso, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity.

29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise.
Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhâna implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhâna--is the cause of an effect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that doctrine also either that the pradhâna as not consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in favour of the Sânkhyas--they do not maintain their pradhâna to be without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the three gunas, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhâna forms a whole containing the three gunas as its parts.--We reply that such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without parts 1. And each guna by itself assisted merely by the two other gunas constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature 2.--So that the objection lies against the Sânkhya
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view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhâna rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhâna consists of parts.--If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhâna cannot be eternal, and so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhâna to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman.
The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do not get beyond the first atom  1 If, on the other hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.
As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.
30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).
We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various powers.--How then--it may be asked--do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed with various powers?-He is, we reply, endowed with all powers, 'because that is seen.' For various scriptural passages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers, 'He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is
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never surprised' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 4); 'He who desires what is true and imagines what is true' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail') (Mu. Up. I,1,9); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gârgî, sun and moon stand apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9); and other similar passages.
31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).
Let this be granted.--Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action 1; so, for instance, in the passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know (from mantras, arthavâdas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, 'No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?
The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands, hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' Sve. Up. III, 19) declares that Brahman
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although devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible capacities.
32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings engaging in any action) having a motive.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.--The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, 'on account of actions having a purpose.'--We know from ordinary experience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage confirming this result of common experience, 'Verily everything is not dear that you may have everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various contents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of activity also.--Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intelligent person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created this world without any motive.--That, we reply, would contradict the omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by Scripture.--Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent Being is untenable.

33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life.
The word 'but' discards the objection raised.--We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of highposition who have no unfulfilled desires left have no
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reference to any extraneous purpose; but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature 1, without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned 2--Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.--Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for Scripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.
34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of
his regarding (merit and demerit); for so (Scripture) declares.
In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.--The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy; to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord affirmed by Sruti and Smriti. Moreover, as the infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty, a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty, "because he is bound by regards." If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation, he would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards, i. e. he has to look to merit and demerit. Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of Parganya, the Giver of rain. For as Parganya is the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences between these classes of beings
are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.--And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'For he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kaush. Up. III, 8) 1; and, 'A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work' (Bri. Up. III, 2, 13). Smriti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so, for instance, 'I serve men in the way in which they approach me' (Bha. Gî. IV, 11).
35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.
But--an objection is raised-the passage, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second,' affirms that before the creation there was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular reasoning that work depends on diversity of
condition of life, and diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as acting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen; but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it follows that the first creation must have been free, from inequalities.
This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is without beginning.--The objection would be valid if the world had a beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore no logical objection to their operation.--To the question how we know that the world is without a beginning, the next Sûtra replies.

36. (The beginninglessness of the world; recommends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).
The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to acquire in the doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad action. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, and it is of a uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from action produced by the mental impressions or wrath, hatred, and other afflicting passions 1. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be formed; so that--on the doctrine
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of the world having a beginning-we are led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand, explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains.--Moreover, the fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in Sruti and Smriti. In the first place, we have the scriptural passage, 'Let me enter with this living Self (gîva), &c. (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to creation, 'the living Self'--a name applying to it in so far as it is the sustaining principle of the prânas--shows that this phenomenal world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the prânas would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world's beginning, by a name which depends on the existence of those prânas. Nor can it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the prânas; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than a mere future relation.--Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As the creator formerly devised (akalpayat) sun and moon (Ri. Samh. X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Smriti also declares the world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its beginning, nor its support' (Bha. Gî. XV, 3). And the Purâna also declares that there is no measure of the past and the future Kalpas.
37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).
The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.
Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which
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it was to show why his view should be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Mâyâ,--on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.














15. And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed.
For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads exist. That it is not a general rule that when one thing exists another is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists; for in that case non-difference
does not exist, although the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its effect 1.--But--it may be objected--even in the case of things other (i.e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly depends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed only when fire exists.--We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been extinguished; as, for instance, in the case ofsmoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.--Well, then--the objector will say--let us add to smoke a certain qualificationenabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind 2 does not exist unless fire exists.--Even thus, we reply, your objection is not valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the non-difference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ (buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly 3. And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.--Or else we have to read (in the Sûtra) 'bhâvât,' and to translate, 'and on account of the existence or observation.' The non-difference of cause and effect results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of perception. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not perceive a thing called 'cloth,' in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggregate
of which is identical with the grosser threads), in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Kh. Up. VI, 4); those, again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the world; not to pradhâna, &c.), we have already explained.

16. And on account of that which is posterior (i. e. the effect) being that which is.
For the following reason also the effect is to be considered as non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i.e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For in passages like,' In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which is' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3); and, 'Verily, in the beginning this was Self, one only' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, i, i), the effect which is denoted by the word 'this' appears in grammatical co-ordination with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing; for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different from the cause. As the cause, i e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore the effect is non-different from the cause.
17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply) not so, (because
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the term 'that which is not' denotes) another quality (merely); (as appears) from the complementary sentence.
But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the effect before its production as that which is not; so, for instance, 'In the beginning this was that only which is not' (Kh. Up. III, 19, 1); and 'Non-existent 1 indeed this wasin the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its production.
This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its production is not meant absolute Non-existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning is determined by itscomplementary part. With reference to the passage. 'In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that what is there denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is--in the complementary passage, 'That became existent'--referred to by the word 'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'
The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time.--Hence with reference to the other passage also, 'Non-existing indeed,' &c., thecomplementary part, 'That made itself its Self,' shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute Non-existence is not meant.--It follows from all this that the designation of 'Non-existence' applied to the effect before its production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those things which are distinguished
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by name and form are in ordinary language called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation.
18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.
That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural passage.
We at first set forth the argumentation.--Ordinary experience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain determined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in anycausal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well?--Let us then maintain, the asatkâryavâdin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (atisaya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.--What, we ask in return, do you understand by that 'atisaya?' If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the atisaya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can
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determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that power.--Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called samavâya connexion 1.--If, we reply, you assume the samavâya connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the samavâya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by samavâya, and then that connexion will again require a new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of connexions; or else you will have to maintain that the samavâya is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of the samavâya relation 2.--Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the samavâya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion.--Then, we reply, conjunction (samyoga) also must be connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the samavâya
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connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion 1.--Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the samavâya relation has really no purport.
In what manner again do you--who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavâya relation--assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part?--If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended.--Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts 2.--In that case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain
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given parts we should always have to assume further parts  1.--Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular part.--That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than Devadatta can be present in Srughna and in Pâtaliputra on one and the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yagñadatta, who, as being two different persons, may live one of them at Srughna and the other at Pâtaliputra.--If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part. If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail. But such things are not seen to take place.
We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause.--That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and as such requires an agent  2, just as the action of walking does. To speak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction.
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[paragraph continues] But if you deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something else, and again that when the origination of the two halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is originated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative) causes are originated  1.' But as a matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in existence.--Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self.--How, we ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use, for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Pûrnavarman,' the declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal
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agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman ace both equally non-entities and can never be.--But, the asatkâryavâdin here objects, from your doctrine there follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether useless that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its origination.--Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown above.--Nor does a substance become another substance merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c., remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial beings, because the different states in which they appear are not separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after
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the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.
It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are illegitimately used.--The preceding arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only 1.
The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results something else
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[paragraph continues] (viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a certain relative power (atisaya) of the inherent cause; he thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists in the cause already.
We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world.
The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding Sûtra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sûtra is the one (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That passage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its origination, coordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,' proves that the effect exists in--and is non-different from--the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its cause by samavâya, it would be something different from the cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c.
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[paragraph continues] (VI, 1, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in--and is not different from--the cause.
19. And like a piece of cloth.
As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.--Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we conclude that the latter is non-different from the former.
20. And as in the case of the different vital airs.
It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different kinds of vital air--such as prâna the ascending vital air, apâna the descending vital air, &c.--are suspended, in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects, such as thebending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped. When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects also are brought about, in addition to mere life.--Nor must the vital airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as something else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common character. Thus (i. e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived.--As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and
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non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage that 'What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived, what is not known is known' (Kh. Up. VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled  1.
21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated (as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.--If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent cause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account of the other being designated.' For Scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman, as is shown by the passage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O Svetaketu!' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7.)--Or else (if we interpret 'the other' of the Sûtra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i. e. Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, 'Having created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i. e. the unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage also, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names and forms' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates the living (soul) by the word 'Self,' shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an independent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death, old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself absolutely stainless,
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look on this altogether unclean body as forming part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Further, it would remember that it had created this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what would be beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.
22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.
The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.--We rather declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i. e. different from the embodied Self, is the creativeprinciple of the world. The faults specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not attach to thatBrahman; for as eternal freedom is its characteristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator of the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For scriptural passages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' Bri. Up. II, 4, 5; 'The Self we must search out, we must try to understand,' Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1; 'Then he becomes
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united with the True,' Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self mounted by the intelligent Self,' Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.--And if it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of non-difference (for instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a jar.--Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration of non-difference contained in such passages as 'that art thou.' the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative quality ofBrahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the non-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and so on, which spring from name and form the presentationsof Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once. The illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows from passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 'That we must search for,' &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul; whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.
23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be established.
As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth, nevertheless great variety is observed, some being
precious gems, such as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like, being of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at dogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandalwood and cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces various effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) cannot be maintained.--Further 1 arguments are furnished by the fact of all effect having, as Scripture declares, their origin in speech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream phantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).
24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so Brahman does).
Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and the like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto by providing themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs, wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be without any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing itself with instruments to work with? We therefore maintain that Brahman is not the cause of the world.
This objection is not valid, because causation is possible
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in consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal substance, as in the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice respectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of Brahman also. And if you object to this analogy for the reason that milk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent, viz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat. If milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel it to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is merely completed. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other hand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus Scripture also declares, 'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (Sve. Up. VI, 8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.
25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in ordinary experience.
Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent things have the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the other hand, that intelligent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed to their several work only after having provided themselves with a complete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman, which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any auxiliary?
We reply, 'Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, rishis, and other beings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without availing themselves of any
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extraneous means, by their mere intention, which is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power--a fact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, and purânas;--and as the spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female crane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond to another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman also may be assumed to create the world by itself without extraneous means.
Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following style.--The gods and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel instances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For the material causes operative in the production of palaces and other material things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent Selfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which, owing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree of consistency. And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of thunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling intelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually to move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being 1; it rather wanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as the creeper climbs up the tree.--Hence all these illustrative examples cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.
To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters, &c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the other side, possess the common attribute of intelligence, potters require for their work extraneous means (i.e. means lying outside their bodies) and gods do not. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require no extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is to point out that a peculiarly conditioned capability which
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is observed in some one case (as in that of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other cases also.
26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of thetexts declaring Brahman to be without parts.
Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one, without a second, modifying itself without theemployment of any extraneous means, is the cause of the world.--Now, another objection is raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under discussion.--The consequence of the Vedânta doctrine, it is said, will be that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its effects, because it is not composed of parts. IfBrahman, like earth and other matter, consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it undergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But Scripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare, 'He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Sve. Up. VI, 19); 'That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12); 'He is to be described by No, no' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 2,6); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of any distinctions in Brahman.--As, therefore, a partial modification is impossible, a modification of the entire Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves a cutting off ofBrahman from its very basis.--Another consequence of the Vedântic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive 'to see'Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen without any endeavour, and apart from them noBrahman exists.--And, finally, the texts declaring Brahman to be unborn are contradicted thereby.--If, on the other hand--in order to escape from these difficulties--we assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do violence to thosetexts which declare Brahman not to be made up of parts.
Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is non-eternal.--Hence the Vedântic point of view cannot be maintained in any way.

27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).
The word 'but' discards the objection.--We deny this and maintain that our view is not open to any objections.--That the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 'on account of sacred texts.' For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from itseffects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of cause and effect ('That divinity thought) let me enter into these three divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (Kh. Up. III, 12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the passage, 'then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of place; since the individual soul is always united with the effects ofBrahman, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahmanbecoming the object of perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman has to be. admitted.--Nor do we violate those texts which declareBrahman to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just because Scripture reveals it. For Brahmanwhich rests exclusively on the holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are authoritative--
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not the senses, and so on--must be accepted such as the texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought! As the Purâna says: 'Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above all material causes 1.' Therefore the cognition of what is supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.
But--our opponent will say--even the holy texts cannot make us understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions 'at the atirâtra he is to take the shodasin-cup,' and 'at the atirâtra he is not to take the shodasin-cup') any contradiction which may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.
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No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts.--Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahmanas undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world; that being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own. For in the scriptural passage beginning 'He can only be described by No, no' (which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in the words 'O Ganaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4).--Hence our view does not involve any real difficulties.
28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods 1, &c.).
Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self
of a dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahmanalso, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity.

29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise.
Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhâna implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhâna--is the cause of an effect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that doctrine also either that the pradhâna as not consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in favour of the Sânkhyas--they do not maintain their pradhâna to be without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the three gunas, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhâna forms a whole containing the three gunas as its parts.--We reply that such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without parts 1. And each guna by itself assisted merely by the two other gunas constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature 2.--So that the objection lies against the Sânkhya
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view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhâna rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhâna consists of parts.--If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhâna cannot be eternal, and so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhâna to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman.
The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do not get beyond the first atom  1 If, on the other hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.
As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.
30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).
We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various powers.--How then--it may be asked--do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed with various powers?-He is, we reply, endowed with all powers, 'because that is seen.' For various scriptural passages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers, 'He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is
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never surprised' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 4); 'He who desires what is true and imagines what is true' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail') (Mu. Up. I,1,9); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gârgî, sun and moon stand apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9); and other similar passages.
31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).
Let this be granted.--Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action 1; so, for instance, in the passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know (from mantras, arthavâdas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, 'No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?
The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands, hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' Sve. Up. III, 19) declares that Brahman
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although devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible capacities.
32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings engaging in any action) having a motive.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.--The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, 'on account of actions having a purpose.'--We know from ordinary experience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage confirming this result of common experience, 'Verily everything is not dear that you may have everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various contents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of activity also.--Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intelligent person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created this world without any motive.--That, we reply, would contradict the omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by Scripture.--Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent Being is untenable.

33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life.
The word 'but' discards the objection raised.--We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of highposition who have no unfulfilled desires left have no
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reference to any extraneous purpose; but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature 1, without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned 2--Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.--Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for Scripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.
34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of
his regarding (merit and demerit); for so (Scripture) declares.
In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.--The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy; to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord affirmed by Sruti and Smriti. Moreover, as the infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty, a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty, "because he is bound by regards." If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation, he would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards, i. e. he has to look to merit and demerit. Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of Parganya, the Giver of rain. For as Parganya is the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences between these classes of beings
are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.--And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'For he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kaush. Up. III, 8) 1; and, 'A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work' (Bri. Up. III, 2, 13). Smriti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so, for instance, 'I serve men in the way in which they approach me' (Bha. Gî. IV, 11).
35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.
But--an objection is raised-the passage, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second,' affirms that before the creation there was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular reasoning that work depends on diversity of
condition of life, and diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as acting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen; but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it follows that the first creation must have been free, from inequalities.
This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is without beginning.--The objection would be valid if the world had a beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore no logical objection to their operation.--To the question how we know that the world is without a beginning, the next Sûtra replies.

36. (The beginninglessness of the world; recommends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).
The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to acquire in the doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad action. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, and it is of a uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from action produced by the mental impressions or wrath, hatred, and other afflicting passions 1. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be formed; so that--on the doctrine
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of the world having a beginning-we are led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand, explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains.--Moreover, the fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in Sruti and Smriti. In the first place, we have the scriptural passage, 'Let me enter with this living Self (gîva), &c. (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to creation, 'the living Self'--a name applying to it in so far as it is the sustaining principle of the prânas--shows that this phenomenal world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the prânas would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world's beginning, by a name which depends on the existence of those prânas. Nor can it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the prânas; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than a mere future relation.--Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As the creator formerly devised (akalpayat) sun and moon (Ri. Samh. X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Smriti also declares the world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its beginning, nor its support' (Bha. Gî. XV, 3). And the Purâna also declares that there is no measure of the past and the future Kalpas.
37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).
The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.
Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which
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it was to show why his view should be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Mâyâ,--on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.


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